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NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL LAW 
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has struck down all limits 
on campaign expenditures, some limits on campaign contributions, state 
experiments in open primaries, and the central feature of the Voting Rights 
Act. The decisions have not been popular, and, in many cases, the reasoning has 
been quite inventive and has veered away from precedent. The question behind 
this article is whether there is an underlying ideology connecting these 
decisions. 
One possibility is that these cases are simply a function of rigorous 
application of doctrinal commitments. The Justices who led the charge on these 
cases might believe, as an outgrowth of their theories of constitutional 
adjudication, in a fairly absolute First Amendment and a rigorous Tenth 
Amendment. Accordingly, it might be that the centerpiece of the Voting Rights 
Act and the centerpiece of the campaign-finance laws had to be sacrificed 
because of intellectual integrity. Alternatively, one might read this history 
through a cynical lens adopted by some Court critics: The Court is simply 
exercising raw power. If you take this view, there is no “Roberts Court”; there 
is something more like a “Kennedy–Roberts alliance” made up of five partisan 
Justices (Roberts, Kennedy, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) who use their power to 
benefit those whom they perceive to be on their team. In this version of recent 
history, the Kennedy–Roberts alliance think the Voting Rights Act hurt 
Republicans, so they used invented doctrine to strike it down; they think that 
fewer restrictions on corporate speech cause Democrats to lose at the polls, so 
they have struck down corporate expenditure rules. Another, related possibility 
is that the members of the Kennedy–Roberts alliance are driven by racial, 
ethnic, or class concerns. The “us” and “them” within the Court are not political 
teams, but factional ones. 
A third possibility is that the Justices are neither doctrinal nor partisan nor 
group-defending, but driven by an ideology—by something like neoliberalism. 
In this possibility, the Justices have used their power to build a political society 
around general principles of politics, persons, and government with which they 
align. The members of the Court have a background set of political philosophies 
about government itself that drive these decisions. 
If this possibility is the best explanation—or even part of the explanation—
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then the task here is to explain that ideology. What do recent election-law cases 
suggest about the way government and politics should work? Do Justices 
Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito believe that democracy is a good way to improve 
the moral character of citizens, to increase the flow of information to 
decisionmakers, and to lead to greater peace and stability? Do they believe that 
power should be primarily allocated to the public, or is the public a check on 
the exercise of the power of elites? Do they have a theory of power? 
This investigation cannot help but be a form of ideological palace intrigue 
focused on the head of the Court: “What does Justice Roberts really think 
about democracy and his own role in it?” The texts are few, and the writers are 
even fewer—just a dozen men and women over the last twenty-five years have 
struck down laws supported by a broad majority of Americans.1 I regret that 
imbalance. I find nothing particularly interesting about the minds or theories of 
these men and women, except inasmuch as those with power are always 
interesting. But if these dozen men and women are aggressively changing the 
rules of the American polity, it is worth exploring what they think government 
should look like. Furthermore, they are not men or women outside of their 
time, but part of it, and symptoms—as well as causes—of contemporary 
ideology. 
This article, besides being royalist in its focus, is also speculative. One of the 
more prominent features of the Kennedy–Roberts alliance election-law 
opinions is how short, ahistorical, and formal they are. The effort to find a 
background theory of politics connecting Shelby County v. Holder,2 Citizens 
United v. FEC,3 and other landmark cases is necessarily speculative. Any 
positive vision of politics—understood broadly as how power should be 
organized—comes through in glimpses. The ideas largely grow from the 
negative space left in opinions and in descriptions of the market. Government is 
often described negatively—in terms of things that politics does badly and 
things that politics should not do. For example, Justice Roberts wrote in a 
recent opinion that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary 
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”4 But he does not 
elsewhere explain what the objectives or hallmarks of democratic government 
are. All the reader gets are glimpses, shadows, adjectives, ellipses, and guesses 
instead of a robust theory of government, politics, and power. 
In this article, I look at four features that might underpin the ideology of the 
Kennedy–Roberts alliance. The first is complacency about the threat of internal 
democratic dissolution. This feature is revealed by the way in which the 
Kennedy–Roberts alliance has weighed First Amendment speech interests 
 
  1.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976). 
      2.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
        3.   558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 4.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) (quoting 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).  
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against the threat of corruption, as compared to other threats. A lack of concern 
about internal democratic dissolution is an unusual jurisprudential 
characteristic that is at odds with both classical liberalism and the Chicago 
school of economics. 
Second, the opinions show a surprising lack of commitment to federalism, 
suggesting that the Kennedy–Roberts alliance’s federalism cases are more 
about taking certain decisions away from democratic choice rather than 
relocating those decisions in the states. Third, despite rhetoric about a wide-
open marketplace, the opinions endorse a vision of a regulated political 
marketplace, unregulated only in regards to the spending of money. Fourth, and 
finally, the cases suggest that the role of a person in a democratic society is 
primarily that of a government-trusting self-interested consumer, instead of a 
skeptical citizen, and that the job of the Court is to protect the material 
condition of the person, as opposed to her political position. 
Perhaps what is most striking is that the vision of politics that emerges from 
these cases is not actually federalist in the sense of decentralized power, nor is it 
laissez faire. If the political law of the modern Court is driven by ideology, it is 
an ideology that gives states more power to pass their own laws but less power 
to define their own political experiments and their own polities. A good polity is 
imagined, it might appear, as a public of relatively passive consumers, who are 
to be engaged with their government sufficiently so as to not lose faith in it, but 
no more. It is a market run by a few powerful players, who are responsible for 
the distribution of goods, and an elite class—the Court—responsible for 
policing public morality.5 I call this ideology “postpolitical” democratic theory—
a vision of democracy without a major political role for the citizens within it. 
Whether or not it is also neoliberal I leave to the reader. 
Before I begin in earnest, a note on this article’s protagonists. Who are they, 
really? I have struggled with what to call the “they” whose ideology is being 
examined: they are neither a precise set of people, nor do they nicely fall into 
the timeline of various ascendancies; the Court’s ideological shift precedes John 
Roberts becoming Chief Justice. Ultimately I have settled, with some 
dissatisfaction, on calling “them” “the Kennedy-Roberts alliance.” Many of the 
cases I discuss were decided after Justice Kennedy joined the Court in 1988, and 
he joined the majority in all of them. He has also endorsed the logic in all of the 
relevant cases that preceded his tenure. At the same time, Chief Justice John 
 
 5.  As former Duke Law School Dean Paul Carrington wrote about the First Amendment, the 
Constitution has become a tool for replacing self-government with elite government: 
The text of the [First] Amendment, intended to express a right central to democratic self-
government, has been transmogrified into the means by which life-tenured judges supported 
by an intellectual elite and the barons of the media suppress self-government and force on 
fellow citizens the moral and political precepts of a ruling class. These precepts strongly favor 
powerful individuals (such as those who profit from the "infotainment" industry) and their 
profit-seeking corporations over citizens' rights to make collective decisions about the 
communities in which they live and work. 
Paul Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2001). 
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Roberts has clearly played a role in accelerating these tendencies and shows 
some of the greatest impatience and formalism. 
II 
THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM 
The Court’s election-law federalism jurisprudence suggests that it perceives 
the federalism principle as more about limiting federal power than granting 
power to the states. On the one hand, some election-law cases rely heavily on 
federalism. For example, in order to strike down the Voting Rights Act in 
Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Roberts created an “equal sovereignty 
principle,” which has weak or no grounding in text or history.6 The idea of the 
“equal sovereignty principle” is that Congress may not have laws that treat 
states differently. The Court held that the formula that determined which states 
need preclearance for voting changes failed to treat states as equal sovereigns.7 
Such a failure constituted a violation of the Tenth Amendment.8 “The [Voting 
Rights Act] differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that 
all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”9 As Professor Rick Hasen has argued, 
the radicalism of the reasoning in Shelby County cannot be overstated.10 In the 
words of Michael McConnell, the idea of equal sovereignty is “made up. . . . It 
might be an attractive principle, but it doesn’t seem to be in the Constitution.”11 
A similar inventiveness was on display in Alden v. Maine, where the Court 
considered a state’s authority to allow American Indian tribes to sue the state. 
In Alden, Justice Kennedy openly ignored both doctrine and text, instead 
creating a principle he found “implicit in the constitutional design.”12 
Accordingly, after reading Shelby County and Alden, one might conclude 
that equal sovereignty and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, although textually 
weak, reflect a genuine ideological commitment to decentralized power. 
However, in election law more generally, the Court has shown little deference 
to the rights of states to organize their political societies in the way they want. 
There is essentially no federalism analysis in any cases regarding campaign-
finance law, nor in cases involving political parties. In California Democratic 
Party v. Jones, the Court held that California had no right to experiment with its 
political structures.13 The question in that case was whether California could use 
a “blanket” primary. The word “federalism” did not even appear in the 
 
 6.  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623. 
 7.  Id. at 2631. 
 8.  Id. at 2623–24.  
 9.  Id. at 2621 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
 10.  See Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291612. 
 11.  Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the Supreme Court, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 5, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back- at-the-supreme-court. 
 12.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999). 
 13.  California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
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majority opinion, which struck down the state-referendum-passed law.14 
Although Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, mentioned that “states have a 
major role to play in structuring and monitoring the election process,” he did 
not fully engage in a theory of democratic devolution.15 In Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, discussed below, the term “federalism” also did not 
appear.16 Similarly, neither a federalism nor a state-sovereignty analysis 
appeared in Randall v. Sorrell or Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett, both of which were cases about states experimenting with 
different ways to finance elections.17 
If the Court were serious about federalism as a source of state 
empowerment, it would seem that states’ sovereignty would at least encompass 
the power to create the political structures that it wanted. Justice Scalia, in 
concurring in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a case upholding 
Indiana’s voter ID law, accused the dissent of encouraging “detailed judicial 
supervision” of state election-law practices—something he openly supports in 
the campaign-finance arena.18 Instead, federalism appears to be less about 
empowering states as laboratories and more about the limitation of democratic 
choice. Seen through this lens, federalism may primarily be a tool to take 
certain items outside the scope of popular discussion and popular control. 
III 
THE REGULATED MARKET 
The Kennedy–Roberts alliance has often described its commitment to an 
open marketplace of ideas. Indeed, one might get the impression from Citizens 
United that the Court does not think that the judiciary or the legislative branch 
should interfere with or structure the political marketplace. However, many 
commenters have identified holes in this open-marketplace premise. 
The Court’s role in protecting what it perceives to be a marketplace of ideas 
is rhetorically grounded in the First Amendment. Justice Alito has noted the 
“close connection between our Nation’s commitment to self-government and 
the rights protected by the First Amendment” and has described the First 
Amendment as a market amendment. “The First Amendment creates ‘an open 
marketplace’ in which differing ideas about political, economic, and social 
issues can compete freely for public acceptance without improper government 
interference.”19 The job of the market is to enable a wide-open choice between 
competing theories of what is true in the world and what should be done about 
those truths. Similarly, Justice Roberts has noted: “In a democracy, 
 
 14.  See id.  
 15.  Id. at 572. 
 16.  See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
 17.  Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2011); 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240 (2006). 
 18.  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 208 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 19.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012). 
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campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. 
The First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to 
such speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of 
ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.”20 The em dashes tell the story: 
Freedom is freedom to interchange ideas. The market is the evidence of liberty. 
This self-described open-market idea has been recognized by its supporters as 
well as its critics: “Citizens United advances an understanding of a laissez-faire 
marketplace of ideas.”21 
However, the nature of the market that the Court has actually endorsed is 
neither open nor unregulated. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that “the 
central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in 
which ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of 
public interest would thrive, for only in such a society can a healthy 
representative democracy flourish.”22 However, the subsequent interpretation 
of “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” has been less focused on inhibition, 
robustness, and openness and more focused on whether or not there is a market 
for political power with a limited number of clear choices among which the 
consumer–citizen may select. 
The Kennedy–Roberts alliance is openly committed to the importance of a 
stable two-party system instead of a wide-open party model. The goal of parties 
is to create a menu of options—but, ideally only two—that are coherent to the 
public. Accordingly, the rule of thumb for political-party litigation is—with a 
few exceptions—that if a major political party is part of the litigation and the 
case relates to the rights of political parties, the major political party wins.23 
That is true whether the major political party is opposed by the state, 
candidates, or minor political parties.24 As Justice O’Connor said in Davis v. 
Bandemer, “There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable 
two party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and 
effective government.”25 The Court has justified the two-party system as a stable 
institution that provides a good shorthand for uninformed voters.26 
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Court recognized the right of 
the major parties to exist as ideologically coherent entities as one of the most 
important associational rights and implied that the country’s democratic system 
would be jeopardized if a limited number of major political parties did not 
 
 20.  Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2826. 
 21.  Robert L. Kerr, What Justice Powell and Adam Smith Could Have Told the Citizens United 
Majority, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 211, 226 (2010). 
 22.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 23.  See Jones, 530 U.S. 567; see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., The Role of Political Parties, 
in THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 186 (4th ed. 2012). 
 24.  See Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).  
 25.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986). 
 26.  See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997).  
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represent clear ideological positions.27 The law in question in Jones allowed all 
people, regardless of party affiliation, to vote for any candidate in any party 
primary. It was struck down as a violation of the First Amendment.28 
In Timmons, the Court upheld a state fusion ban.29 The ban made it illegal in 
Minnesota for a party to nominate someone for office who had been nominated 
by another party. The ban was passed as part of a sweeping effort by the major 
political parties to reduce the power of minor parties and to limit the scope of 
options in the political marketplace.30 Nonetheless, the Court held that the state 
had a strong interest in limiting fusion because it could lead to voter confusion 
and factionalism.31 The majority opinion implicitly endorsed a two-party system: 
“[T]he States’ interest permits them to enact reasonable election regulations 
that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system . . . .”32 
On the other hand, Justice Stevens, in dissent, said that “the fact that the 
law was both intended to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a 
matter that should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutionality.”33 
Whether or not Stevens was correct, his critique pointed out that the majority 
of the Court is actually supportive of a highly regulated duopoly in the political 
sphere. A “strong and stable” two-party system enables just enough consumer 
choice that the consumer–citizens may express themselves and discipline bad 
actors.34 Accordingly, the Court has struck down laws, like that in Jones, that 
have undermined the duopoly, and has upheld those that have reinforced it. 
The Court has claimed to do so to encourage stability and diminish confusion 
and factionalism among voters. Although all of these are indeed real 
democratic values, the Court has invoked them in order to achieve regulated 
instead of totally “unfettered” markets.35 
IV 
INDIFFERENCE TOWARDS CORRUPTION 
Classical liberalism saw corruption as a fundamental threat to liberal 
 
 27.  530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000). 
 28.  Id. at 586. 
 29.  Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354. 
 30.  DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT BOX: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO VOTING SYSTEMS 185 
(2000). 
 31.  Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 378. 
 34.  Id.; see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The stabilizing effects of such a [two-party] system are obvious.”). 
 35.  Christopher S. Elmendorft & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political 
Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 430 (2013) (“The dominant parties in a two-party 
system should instead be understood as, in effect, publicly chartered corporations with a 
constitutionally conferred public function: to integrate voters and interest groups into coherent, 
competitive coalitions with respect to the government at issue, thereby enabling low-information voters 
to obtain representation and to hold the government accountable.”). 
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political society.36 Midcentury Chicago school of economics placed rent-seeking, 
a variation of corruption, at the center of its reasons for decreasing the size of 
government.37 Although neoliberalism is already associated with indifference 
towards various social issues, such as environmental protection and poverty,38 
perhaps at least neoliberal political law should also be associated with 
indifference towards corruption. 
This indifference has been exemplified by the Kennedy–Roberts alliance, 
which has treated corruption as a relatively small risk and has never embraced 
the rent-seeking rhetoric explained below. Indifference towards corruption may 
indicate skepticism about democracy; if one is not particularly prodemocratic, 
then threats of corruption to democratic values like representative equality are 
not serious threats. Alternatively, the indifference may reflect a genuine 
complacency that comes from an ideological optimism: If democracy is deeply, 
profoundly stable, then corruption is not a serious threat. Finally, it may simply 
reflect a fundamental incompatibility between the idea of corruption—which 
involves obligations to act in the public interest—and the idea of the person as a 
consumer as opposed to a citizen. This part discusses this question and gives 
two possible explanations for the peculiar indifference the Court seems to have 
towards corruption. 
In John Locke’s discussion on the dissolution of government, Locke argued 
that the “fountain of public security” was threatened by anyone using her 
wealth to “corrupt the representatives and gain them to his purposes,” or using 
“solicitation, threats, promises, or otherwise” to entice representatives to 
promise future enactments.39 The Framers of the Constitution imported this 
world view. They were “perpetually threatened by corruption.”40 Corruption 
constituted a fundamental “conspiracy against liberty.”41 The fear of corruption 
was “near unanimous,” and the sense was that corruption needed to be 
“avoided, that its presence in the political system produced a degenerative 
effect.”42 At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason said that “[i]f we do 
not provide against corruption, our government will soon be at an end.”43 The 
framers were anxious about the “torrent of corruption, which like a general 
flood, has deluged us all” coming to America.44 Franklin and Washington both 
 
 36.  See GEORGE H. SMITH, THE SYSTEM OF LIBERTY: THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF CLASSICAL 
LIBERALISM 22 (2013).  
 37.  See CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 3 (1989). 
 38.  See Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY & EVENT 1, 
3 (2003) (explaining neoliberalism in contrast to neoconservative administration at the time). 
 39.  JOHN LOCKE, Of the Dissolution of Government, in THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT 114 (Prometheus Books, 1986).  
 40.  J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 507 (1st ed. 1975). 
 41.  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION xiii 
(1992).  
 42.  James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitutional Convention, 56 J. POL. 174, 181 
(1994). 
 43.  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
 44.  BAILYN, supra note 41, at 131. 
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predicted a fairly quick end to the republican project because of corruption.45 
This fear of collapse outlasted the Revolutionary era and was present in the 
jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century. It was part of classical liberalism, 
which assumed representative self-government was fundamentally fragile and 
threatened. In Ex Parte Yarbrough in 1884, the Court held that the right to 
protect against violence and corruption was inherent in any government 
because, without that power, government would not exist.46 Fifty years later, in 
the 1921 case Newberry v. United States, Justice Pitney harped on the central 
fragility of the state.47 He insisted that Congress not be left without the power to 
regulate primary elections to minimize threats of corruption.48 He argued that 
Congress must be able to protect “the very foundation of the citadel” from 
“sinister influences.”49 In a 1961 challenge to a broadly drafted conflict-of-
interest statute, the Supreme Court upheld the statute because the self-
interested use of public offices “endangers the very fabric of a democratic 
society.”50 The fear of internal corruption leading to democratic collapse has run 
throughout the dissents in the Buckley line of cases, as well as in a few 
opinions—such as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. 
FEC—that have taken a broader view of corruption.51 
But the Kennedy–Roberts alliance has not been concerned about corruption 
or democracy being undermined by self-interested actors. Stability, unlike 
threat, is expressed in absences. For example, if one is not worried about 
infidelity or conflict ending a marriage, then neither infidelity nor conflict arises 
in describing the marriage. Likewise, more confidence in the basic stability of a 
liberal democracy means fewer discussions of threats to that democracy. 
Consistent with that confidence, the majority opinions by the Kennedy–Roberts 
alliance have been free of any hand-wringing about the nature of democracy. 
The closest that Kennedy has come to addressing a threat to democracy was 
during a summary conclusion in Citizens United, where he stated that “[t]he 
appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to 
lose faith in our democracy.”52 His logic was that citizens take the fact that 
money is spent as evidence that they have political strength.53 
 
 45.  Id. at 136. 
 46.  Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1884). 
 47.  Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). 
 48.  Id. at 258. 
 49.  Id. at 288–90. 
 50.  United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961). 
 51.  See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (holding that limits on soft money 
expenditures on campaigns was valid, and that regulation on campaign advertisements by corporations 
and unions was narrowly tailored to the government’s interest); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that a Michigan law limiting corporate expenditures to 
political candidates was narrowly tailored to its goal and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 52.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
 53.  This argument is a difficult one with which to grapple—the fact that money is spent might, 
theoretically, make citizens feel good that they are so important, but the question is not the spending of 
money but the perception of influence. How can the perception of spenders’ influence make a citizen 
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Some of the Court’s opinions have even demonstrated impatience with the 
idea that citizens should be troubled with claims of corruption. Consider the 
history of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., a 2007 
Supreme Court case. At issue was a 2000 law that was designed to draw lines 
between electoral activity and nonelectoral activity.54 The law intended to solve 
the problem of the public getting inundated with privately funded 
advertisements just prior to elections.55 It was legal to run any ad so long as it 
did not say “vote for,” “vote against,” or something equally blunt.56 The law was 
challenged by Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., a nonprofit ideological advocacy 
corporation.57 
People worried that the ads were corrupting candidates.58 To see how, 
imagine a candidate for Senate in Missouri in a close race; if she knew that the 
Chamber of Commerce could run an ad naming her, and saying bad things 
about her, right up to the election, she might be wary of supporting bills that the 
Chamber of Commerce opposed, even if the majority of her constituency 
favored it. The ads at the center of Wisconsin Right To Life were called “sham” 
because they were really designed to shape elections, even though they were 
purportedly just about calling those in power to account.59 So Congress, after 
years of cross-partisan haggling, proscribed ads that named a candidate within a 
particular time period before an election.60 After that, a corporation, or any 
person or entity, could not name a candidate in an ad right before an election, 
whether or not it said “vote for” or something similar.61 
The law was initially upheld by the Court in 2003 but then struck down in 
2007.62 In the opinion striking down the law, Justice Roberts rejected both 
Congress’s policy and the reasoning of the Court from four years prior.63 The 
opinion reads like a clean, formal, impatient screed. Justice Roberts, exhibiting 
formality, relied on a strict construction of corruption—quid pro quo—and then 
determined that there was no quid pro quo and therefore no value against 
which to weigh the First Amendment.64 Further, demonstrating his impatience, 
Roberts, referring to the claim that the ads were corrupting, wrote: “Enough is 
enough.”65 Years of congressional work, in response to public outcry, were all 
dismissed with this three-word gesture. This impatience reflects Justice Roberts’ 
 
feel like she has ultimate influence?  
 54.  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455–56 (2007). 
 55.  See id. at 522–24 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 56.  Id. at 456.  
 57.  Id. at 458. 
 58.  See id. at 478.  
 59.  See id. at 498. 
 60.  See id. at 456. 
 61.  See id.  
 62.  Id. at 460–61. 
 63.  Id. at 457–61. 
 64.  Id. at 476–78.  
 65.  Id. at 478. 
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sense that the problem Congress was grappling with was not (unlike, for 
instance, terrorism) a real problem. 
To that end, terrorism cases help highlight the Court’s indifference towards 
corruption. In those cases, the First Amendment has been more carefully 
weighed against the threat of terrorism than it is formally treated as an absolute 
value. The cases show that Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and 
Thomas use the First Amendment differently when they perceive a genuine 
countervailing interest, a concept that appears to include terrorism but not 
political corruption. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, those five Justices 
(joined by Justice Stevens) upheld a statute that banned contributions to 
organizations designated as terrorist organizations by the federal government.66 
The Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs sought a declaration that they could 
give money to, among other things, “engage in political advocacy on behalf of 
Kurds who live in Turkey” and “teach PKK members how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.”67 Some of the 
activity was outside the country; some involved writing and speaking before the 
U.S. Congress.68 
Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that a statute criminalizing such 
activities did not violate the First Amendment.69 Unlike in the campaign-finance 
context, Roberts shed abstraction, formalism, and the absolute defense of the 
First Amendment. He wrote of the “real dangers at stake” and chided the 
dissent for its abstraction.70 He deferred to the Congressional judgment that “we 
live in a different world: one in which the designated foreign terrorist 
organizations ‘are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to 
such an organization facilitates that conduct.’”71 He argued that “[t]raining and 
advice on how to work with the United Nations could readily have helped the 
PKK in its efforts to use the United Nations camp as a base for terrorist 
activities.”72 And although he cited to the formal First Amendment doctrine, he 
concluded with a description of the constitutional value of protecting against 
violence: “The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that the people of the 
United States ordained and established that charter of government in part to 
‘provide for the common defence.’”73 
The fact that the First Amendment is also wielded inconsistently within 
 
 66.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010). 
 67.  Id. at 22. 
 68.  Id. at 25. 
 69.  See id. at 7–8. 
 70.  Id. at 38.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 40 (quoting U.S. Const. pmbl.). See, e.g., David Cole, The Roberts Court's Free Speech 
Problem, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (June 28, 2010, 10:55 AM), http:// 
www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/jun/28/roberts-courts-free-speech-problem; Monica Youn, The 
Roberts Court's Free Speech Double Standard, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-roberts-court%E2%80%99s-free-speech-double-standard. 
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election law demonstrates how weak a threat corruption is deemed to be. In 
Timmons, a majority of the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a 
fusion ban.74 Given the First Amendment absolutism in other cases, the 
petitioners likely thought that such a ban, like the independent expenditure 
bans, was a basic violation of parties’ rights to speech and free association, 
candidates’ rights to associate with parties, and voters’ rights to support whom 
they choose during primaries.75 But the petitioners failed.76 The Court shrugged 
off the same associational and speech interests that it used to strike down bans 
on expenditures.77 The governmental interest in creating a coherent, easy-to-
understand marketplace of political parties did not violate the First 
Amendment interest.78 The Court brought a modulated approach toward the 
First Amendment: “No bright line separates permissible election related 
regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment 
freedoms . . . . ‘[N]o litmus-paper test . . . separat[es] those restrictions that are 
valid from those that are invidious. . .The rule is not self-executing and is no 
substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.’”79 The creeping 
government control of speech that Justice Kennedy worried about in Citizens 
United (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too 
often simply a means to control content.”80), was not a threat in Timmons or 
Humanitarian Law Project.81 
These cases—the political-party cases, the terrorism cases, and the 
campaign-finance cases—all are evidence of a certain lack of concern for 
corruption. That lack of concern does not flow naturally from neoliberalism. 
Neoliberal economic theory places a great deal of importance on the threat of 
one variant of corruption: rent-seeking.82 Rents represent “the expenditure of 
resources on the transfer of wealth through law rather than on the production 
of wealth through markets.”83 In the Chicago school tradition, groups are more 
likely to direct their energies—through bribes or other forms of influence—to 
government when government has more power to regulate.84 This model shows 
up in the Gordon Tullock (1967) and Gary Becker (1983) papers on the theory 
of competition among pressure groups for political influence.85 The argument, 
 
 74.  Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 354 (1997). 
 75.  For the arguments made by petitioners, see id. at 358, 362. 
 76.  See id. at 354.  
 77.  Id. at 369. 
 78.  See id. at 364, 367.  
 79.  Id. at 359 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974) (internal quotation removed)). 
 80.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).  
 81.  Cf. Patrick M. Garry, Liberty from On High: The Growing Reliance on a Centralized Judiciary 
to Protect Individual Liberty, 95 KY. L.J. 385, 404 (2006). 
 82.  See CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 3 (1989). 
 83.  Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 408 n.5 (1990).  
 84.  FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICAL EXTORTION 106 (1997) (noting that there is likely a time profile of activity within a single 
industry). 
 85.  See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 
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stripped down, comes to this: The fewer resources over which the state exercises 
dominion, the less that companies and individuals will spend energy trying to 
extract resources from the state.86 The term “corruption” is often renamed 
“rent-seeking.” Rent-seeking and corruption are understood as a central threat 
to the state and are an essential topic of study.87 But the Kennedy–Roberts 
alliance has not explicitly embraced this ideology any more than it did the 
classical liberal anxiety about corruption. “Rent-seeking” is a term that has 
been used only in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Citizens United88 and never by any 
member of the Kennedy–Roberts alliance. Instead, no version of the threat of 
corruption has played a major role in any Kennedy–Roberts decision. 
A. Skepticism About Democracy 
Neoliberalism is often associated with skepticism about democracy. In his 
essay Public Choice versus Democracy, Russell Hardin has explained how 
public-choice theory has revealed some “grievous foundational flaws—in 
democratic thought and practice,” including that it neither leads to majoritarian 
rule (because of the aggregation flaws) nor to good policy decisions.89 The 
conclusion of Hardin and other public-choice theorists has been that many 
problems of resource distribution are better solved by “the market” than by 
representative systems in a mass democracy.90 If one part of politics is made up 
of the question “How should we distribute goods and things?” then the social 
choice theorist’s or market fundamentalist’s answer is “through assigning 
property rights.” The answer voids the need for a central role for other 
mechanisms—such as monarchy, representative democracy, direct democracy, 
or lottery—to make decisions about distributions. It is a political answer that 
narrows the realm of collective decisionmaking via deliberation and decision 
backed by force. 
Kennedy and Roberts have not openly embraced Russell Hardin’s 
antidemocratic political ideology. There has been nothing in the Kennedy–
Roberts alliance’s election-law decisions that suggests that markets are better 
than a representative government for the task of distributing goods. Those cases 
have never called into question the importance of voting as a method of electing 
representatives or of representatives making the central distributional choices 
of a democracy. Therefore, one can fairly argue that they are not neoliberal in 
 
98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983). See also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 7 (1971) (suggesting a much more complex political environment, as opposed 
to modeling a single “rent,” and assumed that the would-be rent-seeker would imagine different rents); 
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967). 
 86.  See, e.g., DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); GEORGE J. STIGLER, CHICAGO 
STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988).  
 87.  See CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 13 (1989). 
 88.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 89.  Russell Hardin, Public Choice versus Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 157, 170 
(David Copp et al. eds., 1993).  
 90.  Id. at 159.  
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this sense. Overall, they have never questioned the right or importance of the 
public making the key distributional choices. 
However, the Court’s decisions in the campaign-finance realm have changed 
who has power in making distributional decisions. Since Citizens United and 
Wisconsin Right To Life, it has been easier for very wealthy individuals and the 
wealthiest companies to have greater power in shaping who is elected to office 
and what policies the elected representatives support. That these companies 
and individuals might have “undue influence” seems not to trouble Justices 
Kennedy and Roberts. That Justice Kennedy and Justice Roberts seem to be 
unconcerned by this influence in the face of a long history of liberal anxiety 
about corruption might indicate that they have some sympathy for Hardin’s 
skepticism. 
B. End of History Complacency 
Another clue about the reasons for the Court’s indifference toward 
corruption comes from the Court’s view of government as largely, if not 
entirely, static. One gets the sense that no theory of government has been seen 
as necessary to Justices Kennedy and Roberts because the democratic state is 
like air—necessary, a part of life itself, unavoidable in the best sense, and 
invisible because it is so central. These thin descriptions of government make 
sense if democracy is viewed as fundamentally solved and stable and problems 
of political organization are not seen as serious. The Court has seemed to say 
that, although the public may quibble about the scope of government at the 
margins, the basic shape of government is stable and not likely to change.91 
This viewpoint might underlie the Court’s indifference towards corruption, 
reflecting an “end of history” ideology that has been part of world culture for 
the last quarter century. In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and the Soviet 
Union began to splinter. Ron Brown became chair of the Democratic National 
Committee, the first African-American to head a major political party. Mindful 
of these transformative events, Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History?, 
an essay (later expanded into a book) arguing that liberal democracy is an 
equilibrium state and that there is no post–liberal democracy system. He 
argued: 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a 
particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.92 
The article was largely about the nature of thinking, not the nature of 
events. Fukuyama’s argument was essentially that the ideal form of government 
had been discovered, not that it would stop history. In this sense, it was not so 
different than the prior two hundred years of argument: that liberal 
representative democracy was a superior form of government. However, the 
 
 91. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997).   
 92.  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INT. 3 (1989).  
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article’s powerful impact on popular culture, and what turned Fukuyama into 
an object of constant discussion, was not the theory of the history of thought, 
but the theory of the history of world events. The key feature of this view—as 
interpreted, not as written—was its political optimism. Fukuyama came to stand 
for the view that liberal democracy was an end of history in a different sense: 
Liberal democracy was unlikely to turn into a totalitarian regime, and it was just 
a matter of time before other countries caught up to the United States and 
Western Europe.93 
Fukuyama caught fire because he said (or was perceived to have said) what 
so many at the time believed and continue to believe: Having once achieved 
representative democracy, America was unlikely to ever become anything else.94 
If one believes or feels that this is the end of history, self-government is not a 
central problem or puzzle. Little will change. Tyranny and oligarchy have been 
solved by the modern democratic form. 
A feature of the end-of-history attitude is also the end of facts and the end 
of the role of history and facts in political-law jurisprudence. If history is 
fundamentally over, only analytical questions remain. History itself—including 
historical threats—gets little attention in the modern Court, and facts play a 
trivial role on the ground. For instance, Citizens United was a statutory 
interpretation case that included an as-applied constitutional challenge.95 The 
Court asked for reargument on the general question of corporate independent 
expenditures even though no record was developed at trial and the issue had 
not been briefed in the courts below.96 Further, in a recent oral argument, 
Justice Scalia suggested that facts do not matter when the principle of the First 
Amendment is at stake.97 Although Justice Sotomayor repeatedly asked for 
evidence from both parties, Justice Scalia rejected the need to develop the 
record, arguing that “we don’t normally require a record to decide what the law 
is.”98 Corruption is therefore treated, in the First Amendment context, as a 
fundamentally abstract problem, outside the bounds of experience and history. 
C. Theory of the Person 
A final explanation for the Court’s indifference towards corruption is that 
 
 93.  Fukuyama must take some blame for the optimistic reading—he did claim that “in the long 
run” liberal democracy would prevail—that action would follow thought. Id. at 4. 
 94.  This tendency to believe in the stability of current affairs may be more than ideological: it may 
be biological. A recent paper about personal psychology describes the “End of History Illusion.” This is 
defined as a widespread belief, which has little evidence in past experience. The belief is held by a 
person about him or herself and is characterized by a belief that up until the present she has undergone 
several changes and growths, but will not continue to grow and change in the future. Jordi Quoidbach 
et al., The End of History Illusion, 339 SCI. MAG. 96 (2013), available at 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dtg/Quoidbach%20et%20al%202013.pdf. 
 95.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 320–21 (2010). 
 96.  Id. at 322. 
 97.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013) (No. 12-536). 
 98.  Id. 
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corruption is a concept that simply does not make sense in the world view of 
Kennedy and Roberts. They have not been worried about corruption because at 
some deep level they do not see it. To them, the word “corruption” is actually 
incoherent because corruption depends upon the idea that people can have 
interactions with government that are not inherently self-oriented. 
Neoliberal scholars tend to construct models of politics and motives starting 
with a very particular (and arguably peculiar) assertion about human nature—
the idea that people are rational maximizers of their own welfare.99 On the one 
hand, they acknowledge that the assertion is a useful fiction; on the other hand 
they use that useful fiction to paint a full portrait of human life.100 Arguably, 
corruption is a word that simply does not make sense in this model. 
It is very hard to talk about corruption in the context of self-interest without 
discussing virtue or becoming circular. In a series of political-law cases, the 
Court held that self-interested behaviors that would previously have been 
coded as corrupt—if not illegal—are either normal or laudable. In a 1999 case, 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the Court noted that gift-
giving was normal behavior and therefore held that under federal gratuities law, 
in order to constitute a bribe, a gift to a federal official had to be tied to a 
specific official act.101 Further, in the 2010 case Skilling v. United States, the 
Court held that the federal mail fraud statute did not criminalize undisclosed 
self-dealing by public officials because an alternate reading would be too vague, 
would violate the due process clause, and would criminalize normal self-
dealing.102 As discussed previously, in Citizens United, which the Court also 
decided in 2010, the Court held that Congress could not prohibit corporations 
from spending money to influence elections and policy because spending money 
to influence elections and policy was normal, even laudable, political 
behavior.103 
These cases are part of the Court’s revision of what constitutes a political 
person. Whereas a political person in the nineteenth century was oriented 
towards the public good, a political person in the vision of the modern-day 
Court maximizes his own personal welfare. This modern, postpolitical ideology 
systematically reduces the role of the political by reducing the number of places 
in which one perceives citizens. This is what has happened in antitrust law, 
where the citizen has been replaced by the consumer by way of the idea that a 
consumer with a political complaint is really a consumer who does not 
understand her own economic complaint.104 The consumer–citizen, on the other 
 
 99.  See Wendy Brown, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY & EVENT  
(2003).  
 100.  See Pierre Bourdieu, The Essence of Neoliberalism, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, 
http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 101.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999). 
 102.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 409 (2010). 
 103.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010).  
 104.  See BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF 
DESTRUCTION 135–38 (2010). 
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hand, has no such obligation: her obligation is to the policies that serve her best. 
The citizen is mostly a consumer, and the consumer is presumed to be self-
interested. 
This idea lies in contrast to two different theories of what is a person in 
democratic society is—one from the founding era, and the other from the late 
nineteenth century. In classical republican theory, the theory that animated the 
founding era, the citizen is the essential unit of a political society.105 Under this 
theory, when citizens lose their virtue and engagement, government collapses.106 
The classical republican citizen should therefore be public-oriented in all things, 
public and private. 
Similarly, in classic liberal theory, which dominated the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, the citizen is, again, central in political life.107 The role 
of law is to protect public action from private interests and to protect private 
interests from public action. “The object of legal science and learning was to 
draw clear boundary lines around these zones of private and public action. The 
judiciary’s power and duty lay in patrolling these boundaries.”108 Unlike in the 
republican thesis, a person has no obligation to join public and private interests; 
she can choose to retreat from society. However, the obligations to the public of 
those dealing in public affairs remain. There exists a clear line between public 
and private, and when the public sphere is entered, various obligations are 
created.109 
Justice Swayne, who had a broad view of property and laissez-faire 
tendencies, also had a demanding view of citizenship. He wrote in 1882 that 
“[t]he foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at once 
sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is 
weakened. When it is destroyed, the fabric must fall. Such is the voice of 
universal history.”110 Unlike in classical republicanism, according to Justice 
Swayne, the citizen only had an obligation to be public-oriented in her public 
life, not in her private life. 
These two eras are linked by the fact that the citizen in both the classic 
republican and classic liberal models makes choices for the public good when 
acting in the public sphere. A citizen may not ethically use government to better 
her own position if she knows it harms others. Said another way, she can 
support laws that help her, but only if she also believes that they will help the 
public as a whole. 
The modern Court has not had the same view of the citizen. Citizens are not 
imagined as either publicly oriented or responsible for most decisions. Instead, 
 
 105.  See William Forbath, Politics, State Building, and the Court 1870–1920, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA VOL. 2 1092 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2007).  
 106.  See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 46 (2014).  
 107.  See Forbath, supra note 105. 
 108.  Id. at 1099.  
 109.  See, e.g., Paul Star, The Classical Discipline, in FREEDOM’S POWER 53 (2006). 
 110.  Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1874). 
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citizens are imagined as self-interest maximizers. One of the ways this portrait is 
drawn is by portraying people as consumers instead of citizens. Scholars openly 
call the public “consumer-citizens.”111 Just a summary of marketplace-of-ideas 
adherents can show how the word “consumer” replaces “citizen.”112 Sometimes 
the consumer consumes things and sometimes the consumer consumes political 
ideas, but the posture is similar. Both market behavior and political-choice 
behavior are seen through the lens of choice and consumption, and the power 
held by the citizen consumer is the power of exit (not buying) or voice (selling). 
This concept is not unlike that of citizens, but the moral orientation is different. 
When people are perceived as consumers, they are perceived to be generally 
self-serving.113 When people are perceived as citizens—at least in the American 
tradition—they are perceived to be public-interest serving. 
This change in perception has been exemplified by a series of cases that 
shifted the First Amendment right from a right to speak to a right to hear. The 
First Amendment played a trivial role in political law until the 1940s.114 The 
right to speak was invoked only with respect to points of view that were 
punished by law.115 It was generally seen as protecting the individual capacity to 
express moral, religious, and political views.116 Speaking constitutes the person 
inasmuch as it constitutes thinking, so the right to speak was centered in the 
right of individuals to hold transgressive beliefs. For the first forty years of its 
modern incarnation, it was a speaker-focused amendment, protecting 
individuals with views far outside the mainstream, such as anarchists, Nazis, and 
communists.117 
Starting around the 1980s, however, First Amendment doctrine started to 
shift away from a focus on the speaker and towards a focus on the listener. In 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court held that a 
referendum in which a Massachusetts banned corporations from making 
contributions or expenditures that influenced the outcome of an election was 
unconstitutional because the law indiscriminately differentiated between 
different types of corporations and citizens had the right to hear and choose 
 
 111.  “When one examines the marketplace of ideas in terms of the incentives of information 
producers, citizen consumers, and political actors, it appears competition within that market produces a 
healthy and substantial dialogue without the need for government interference or direction.” Lillian R. 
BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1258, 1260 n.18 (1994). 
 112.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808 (1995) 
(discussing dissemination of cheap speech and using consumer as a word for the population at large).  
 113.  Behavioral economics has put a sizeable dent in this perception. However, behavioral 
economics has discovered a set of mechanistic behaviors or tendencies within the vision of the person 
as consumer—animal spirits—instead of within the vision of the person as citizen. See, e.g., GEORGE A. 
AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE 
ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009). 
 114.  See Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How Anarchists and 
Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 174 (2011). 
 115.  See id. at 164. 
 116.  See id. at 172–73. 
 117.  See id. at 172. 
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between options.118 According to the majority, “the First Amendment goes 
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit 
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the 
public may draw.”119 Note the language here—the First Amendment is not a 
matter of conscience but a matter of a “stock of information.”120 
The “stock of information” is marketplace rhetoric—information is a 
resource, the “stock” of which enables consumer choice.121 Although there is 
nothing per se more self-oriented about the consumer who chooses from a stock 
of information than the citizen who examines a range of ideas and reasons, the 
rhetoric itself and its structure suggest a different imagination of the moral 
habits of the public. 
Another area demonstrating the transformation from citizen to consumer is 
antitrust, or competition law, which has shifted its focus from politics and 
economic decentralization to economic efficiency. The initial antitrust laws 
were driven by a blend of reasons, including not only the protection of small 
business and anxiety about particular practices, but also the perception that 
monopolization threatened democratic self-government.122 The individual 
threatened by monopolies was both the private individual tradesperson and the 
public citizen. The Clayton Act was passed to stop “combinations of capital” 
that “flaunted their power in the face of the citizenship.”123 Throughout the mid-
1940s, antitrust was understood to protect against the accumulation of economic 
power that threatened to encroach on the power of the citizen. In 1945, Judge 
Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Company of America, referred to 
Sherman’s concerns about limiting aggregated capital because of the 
“helplessness of the individual before them.”124 Antitrust as a force for 
decentralization was important “for its own sake and in spite of possible cost.”125 
In 1948, in United States v. Columbia Steel, Justice Douglas explained that: 
The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that . . . all power tends to develop into a 
government in itself. Power that controls the economy . . . should be scattered into 
many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or 
caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men.126 
However, in the early 1980s, there was a sea change in the understanding of 
the purpose of antitrust law and a related change in the understanding of the 
 
 118.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 119.  Id. at 783. 
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constituent unit that antitrust laws protected. Whereas earlier cases had 
purported to protect citizens and individuals, the new antitrust doctrine 
appeared to protect consumer welfare. The merger guidelines were rewritten to 
place “consumer welfare” as the goal of competition policy.127 Richard Posner 
and Robert Bork argued that current doctrine was based on flawed economic 
ideological premises and that efficiency and consumer welfare—not the goal of 
aiding small businesses or having a decentralized economy—were the only 
legitimate goals of the antitrust statutes.128 Posner argued that there was no 
justification for “using the antitrust laws to attain goals unrelated or antithetical 
to efficiency,” and Bork argued that any political or social concerns were 
necessarily indeterminate, were creating unmanageable standards, and were 
normatively unjustifiable.129 In antitrust, as in election law, the citizen qua 
citizen was replaced by a consumer. The standard by which large concentrations 
of economic power was measured became that of consumer welfare alone, not 
taking into account political power. 
In short, across different fields, the central individual unit in distributive 
policy is the customer or consumer, who exercises choice through purchase and 
interacts with other consumers to create distributions. The consumer largely 
lacks a political dimension—the consumer is a better consumer inasmuch as the 
consumer is driven by preference, not belief about public good. 
This world view is both the most difficult to document—no case explicitly 
erases “citizen” and replaces it with “consumer”—and the most fundamental 
ideological transformation that I have discussed. More than a case striking 
down a particular law does, the replacement of the perceived world of citizens 
with a perceived world of consumers removes public authority from people and 
gives it to “markets,” whose authority is derived from “consumers.” This shift in 
perception transforms what it means to be a person in our society. When a 
person is not a citizen but a consumer, she has a different role. Her societal role 
is to listen, choose, and trust her government. 
V 
TRUST AND DISTRUST 
Indeed, trust that the government, as opposed to the citizens, will provide 
for the public good is an important characteristic of the consumer-citizen. The 
Court has confirmed that notion in various cases, despite its own description of 
its political theory, which purported to be premised in the distrust of power. 
The First Amendment, at the core of which are “certain basic conceptions 
about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy 
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should proceed”130 is the same amendment that, according to Justice Kennedy, 
is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power.”131 In other words, the 
positive central story of politics is one of mistrust of governmental power. 
However, as much as its language has rested on distrust, the Court has also 
indicated that generating trust—as opposed to maintaining the government’s 
actual trustworthiness—may be the primary function of democracy. Trust leads 
to stability, so the consumer—the constituent member of society—should be 
trusting. In contrast, under classical liberal or republican philosophy, 
appearance is not equivalent to reality. The classic threat of private pollution of 
public power is not one of perception, but of reality. Benjamin Franklin worried 
more that people would want a monarch than that they would lose faith in 
democracy.132 Although the shift from that ideology to one focused on 
appearances is not unique to the Kennedy–Roberts alliance, it seems to be 
central to the Kennedy–Roberts alliance’s understanding of the world. 
Since Buckley, the “appearance of corruption” has been deemed equally 
problematic as corruption itself.133 In other words, people’s belief that 
corruption is occurring is as concerning and as destabilizing as corruption itself. 
This sentiment was displayed in the recent case Doe v. Reed, where the 
Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring disclosures of the names of citizens 
who signed a referendum petition.134 Protect Marriage Washington, which had 
submitted a referendum petition containing over 137,000 signatures, claimed 
that forced disclosure of those signatures violated the First Amendment.135 The 
first and primary justification given by the Court for upholding the law was that 
it was needed to keep citizens trustful of government.136 Roberts wrote that 
states’ interests in the integrity of political process is “particularly strong with 
respect to efforts to root out fraud.”137 The Court explained that the potential 
for fraud not only created a risk of fraudulent outcomes, but of a systemic effect 
as well: It “drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds 
distrust of our government.”138 
Perhaps the most stunning version of this “trust” argument shows up in 
Justice Stevens’ decision in Crawford v. Marion County. There, the Court 
justified voter-identification laws on the ground that the absence thereof might 
lead to the perception of fraud at the voting booth, despite the fact that there 
was no evidence of voting fraud.139 “The electoral system cannot inspire public 
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confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the 
identity of voters.”140 Translate this logic into another arena, and one comes up 
with something like: “even if there are no terrorists, the public fear of terrorists 
justifies searches that would otherwise be unreasonable.” 
Stevens, in dissent in Citizens United, wrote: “At stake in the legislative 
efforts to address this threat is therefore not only the legitimacy and quality of 
Government but also the public’s faith therein . . . .”141 Souter wrote in a case 
upholding campaign-contribution limits that “[d]emocracy works ‘only if the 
people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered 
when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse 
suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.’”142 
In fact, the “appearance of trust and legitimacy” line of thinking has become 
so central to the Court’s processing of election-law decisions (many in the First 
Amendment framework) that it appears that the modern Court’s view of 
democracy is premised on trust, not mistrust. The function of democracy, under 
the Court’s apparent ideology, is the production of trust in order to assure 
stability. The function of the citizen is to maintain faith in the polity. This is 
both a meager and important role; it is meager in that it involves no genuine 
critique of government, nor an expectation or requirement of investigation and 
criticism, but demands instead faith. It is important because out of all the 
dystopic visions, the worst dystopia is the collapse of faith and of confidence. 
This focus on the appearance of trustworthiness, in combination with the 
theory of the person as a consumer, not only renders the citizen a consumer in 
the political market, but also diminishes her role in that market as compared to 
her role in the economic market. A citizen in a democracy acts both like a 
consumer in the political realm, and as a consumer in the market for goods. The 
function of the goods consumer is to have confidence in the market because 
that confidence creates growth and wealth. The function of the consumer–
citizen, on the other hand, is to have confidence in politics because that 
confidence creates social peace. The citizen is diminished both in her function 
and in the scope of places where that limited function applies. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
My goal in this article was more to set up provocations than to provide 
answers. However, my tentative thesis is that the Kennedy–Roberts alliance is 
committed to the form of representative democracy for its perceived stability 
but is not committed to decentralized power. 
Politics begin when people come together and ask “what should we do?” 
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and when they are in the position to answer that question with action. The 
political, therefore, encompasses only the people who are within that circle of 
power. However, the Court’s political jurisprudence, both by favoring a limited 
number of political choices (i.e. favoring a two-party system) and by limiting the 
types of things that can be decided (i.e. restricting states’ abilities to define their 
own campaign-finance and primary models), has shifted the role of the person 
from the active decider to the consumer of others’ decisions. This ideology has a 
role for the citizen: to maintain stability; the source of democratic stability may 
be the belief by its citizens in its legitimacy. If the constituent members of a 
society are consumers, not citizens, then, like an economic market, democracy 
fails when those consumers stop believing in it. 
It is possible that the Court has been driven in its political-law jurisprudence 
by the protection of individual rights and markets, or by maintaining a world in 
which distributive choices are made through markets instead of representative 
government. However, although the members of the Kennedy–Roberts alliance 
have not explicitly rejected that ideology, they certainly have not endorsed it. 
 
